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SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND THE NATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY ACT-THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY'S REGULATION 40 C.F.R. Section 1502.22
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) l requires federal
agencies to prepare Environmental Impact Statements (EIS's) for all ma-
jor actions significantly affecting the environment. 2 The EIS must dis-
close and evaluate alternative actions and their environmental conse-
quences. 3 Congress did not address the problem of scientific uncertainty
when it passed NEPA. 4 Ten years later, the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) tackled the issue by including section 1502.22 in its new
regulations governing EIS production. 5 The section provides that if scien-
tific uncertainty exists but can be cured by further research the agency
must do or commission the research. If the necessary research is exorbi-
tantly expensive or beyond the state of the art the agency must make clear
that the uncertainty exists and must also include a worst case analysis in
its EIS. 6
For several years this regulation was virtually overlooked by the agen-
cies and was not the subject of litigation. Recently, however, plaintiffs
have discovered it and used it to block agency action when an agency
overlooked or only paid lip service to the regulation's mandate. The con-
tours of the regulation are still hazy. Four recent federal appellate court
cases have begun shaping the regulation's interpretation, but several is-
sues remain unanswered. This Comment analyzes both the scope of the
regulation and the role courts should play in enforcing and clarifying it.
After a brief background discussion the Comment addresses the regula-
tion's information gathering requirement. It suggests that this duty to
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [hereinafter cited as NEPA] §§ 101-209, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1982)). The policy Congress adopted is
set out in id. § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all
components of the natural environment . . . and recognizing further the critical importance of
restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man,
declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable
means and measures... to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans.
2. Id. § 102,42 U.S.C. § 4332.
3. The actual EIS requirements NEPA places on federal agencies are found in id..
4. Note, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark; New Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for
the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 367,384 (1980) (NEPA
"completely overlooks the possibility that potentially relevant information may be unavailable or
cost-prohibitive.").
5. 40C.F.R. §§ 1500-17(1983).
6. Seeinfranote 19.
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perform or commission research encompasses all important information.
Next it addresses the topic of what the worst case analysis should include.
Finally it addresses the role of the courts in implementing the regulation
as a whole. The Comment advocates hard look review. It concludes that
such review may enhance the quality of agency decisions and accord fair-
ness to those affected by agency action whenever scientific uncertainty
admittedly exists.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1969, Congress created the CEQ to help agencies meet their respon-
sibility of considering environmental values and effects in their decision-
making. 7 CEQ's original power was quite limited. 8 In 1970, President
Nixon expanded that power through Executive Order No. 115 14,9 which
directed CEQ to issue procedural guidelines for agencies preparing
EIS's. 10 CEQ did issue those guidelines" but adherence to them was
spotty in both the agencies and the courts.' 2 In 1977 President Carter
amended Order No. 11514 with Executive Order No. 11991.13 directing
CEQ to promulgate binding regulations. CEQ complied, and its new reg-
ulations took effect on July 30, 1979.14 The Supreme Court has declared
CEQ's regulations to be binding on the agencies and entitled to "substan-
tial deference" by the courts. 15 Such deference means the regulations will
be enforced unless inconsistent with NEPA or its interpretation by the
Supreme Court. 16
The purpose of the regulations was to inform agencies on how to meet
NEPA's procedural and substantive requirements. The regulations place
7. NEPA § 202. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1982). CEQ was created within the Executive Office of the
President to review federal policies and make recommendations for change.
8. The specified functions of CEQ include gathering information, analyzing data. preparing re-
ports, reviewing federal policy for NEPA compliance, and recommending policies to promote envi-
ronmental quality. Id. § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1982).
9. 3 C.F.R. 902 (1970). amended by Exec. Order No. 11,991. May 24, 1977. 3 C.F.R. 123
(1978).
10. 3 C.F.R. 902.904(1970).
I1. 40C.F.R. §§ 1500-17(1973),amendedas40C.F.R. §§ 1500-17(1983).
12. See W. RODGERS. JR.. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 708 (1977) ("[Slome courts entertain doubts on
the statutory justification for the guidelines, calling them *merely advisory.' while others apply them
uncritically or insist they can be ignored only for the 'strongest reasons.'" ): see also Stevens. The
Council on Environmental Qualitv's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National Environmental
PolicyAct, 23 CATt. U.L. REv. 547. 551 (1974).
13. 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978).
14. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-15 (1983).
15. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347,358 (1979).
16. Comment, NEPA After Andrus v. Sierra Club: The Doctrine of Substantial Deference to the
Regulations of the Council On Environmental Quality. 66 VA. L. REv. 843. 846 (1980)
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responsibility for enforcing NEPA equally on the President, the federal
agencies, and the courts to achieve the substantive goal of environmental
balance as set forth in section 101 of NEPA.17 Section 1502 outlines the
specific requirements for EIS preparation. 18 Subsection 1502.22, the sub-
ject of this Comment, sets forth requirements regarding incomplete or
unavailable information. 19
Under section 1502.22 the first duty of an agency that is unable to cal-
culate with certainty the impact of its planned action is to disclose that
fact. 20 Following disclosure, an agency must gather missing informa-
tion.21 If the agency proves that it is impossible to gather such
17. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1983); see supra note I (NEPA § 101 policy statement).
18. 40C.F.R. § 1502 (1983).
19. Id. § 1502.22. It provides that:
When an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human environment in an
environmental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant information or scientific uncer-
tainty, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking or that uncertainty
exists.
(a) If the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among
alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency
shall include the information in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If (1) the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among
alternatives and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or (2) the infor-
mation relevant to adverse impacts is important to the decision and the means to obtain it are not
known (e.g., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of the art) the agency shall weigh
the need for the action against the risk and severity of possible adverse impacts were the action
to proceed in the face of uncertainty. If the agency proceeds, it shall include a worst case analy-
sis and an indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence.
20. Disclosure is predicated on the existence of "scientific uncertainty." See id. The closest
approximation to a definition of scientific uncertainty that can be gleaned from the cases indicates that
the term includes credible scientific disagreement among the experts. An agency's admission of un-
certainty will, of course, suffice. Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Spraying v. Clark (SO-
CATS), 720 F.2d 1475, 1477 (9th Cir. 1983). In Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark (SOE), No. 83-3908,
slip op. at 448 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984), disagreement between environmentalists and BLM scientists
over the long term carcinogenaity of herbicides gave rise to scientific uncertainty as well.
It is probably necessary for courts to recognize only disagreements among experts, to keep the lone
crackpot from gaining undue power to harrass the agency. Courts have the ability to judge the ex-
pertise and believability of scientists. For example, in Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble,
621 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1980), the opinion of one geologist was enough to cast doubt on
previous studies of possible dam failure and require the gathering of supplemental information.
While the regulation is explicit in requiring disclosure, it is silent on when, how, and to whom it
must be made. A reasonable assumption is that disclosure must be made in any draft environmental
assessments and draft impact statements. Circulating the disclosure at a time best suited to elicit
public comment and to perhaps trigger the submission of the missing data from outside sources makes
sense. As the SOCATS case makes clear, the regulation and the worst case analysis it may call for
apply to environmental statements and assessments, before an agency makes a decision. 720 F.2d at
1481.
21. NEPA dictates that an agency gathering information must utilize a "systematic, interdiscipli-
nary approach," must include "methods ... which will insure that presently unquantified environ-
mental values may be given appropriate consideration," and must include with its decision a "de-
tailed statement" or EIS of thealtematives to and the effects of the proposed action. NEPA § 102, 42
U.S.C. x4332 (1982). One court has interpreted NEPA to require that agencies gather enough infor-
Washington Law Review Vol. 60:101, 1984
information, 22 it can proceed with the proposed action only after first
weighing the need to proceed against possible risks, 23 and then preparing
and including in its EIS a worst case analysis.
mation "to enable the decisionmaker to consider the environmental factors and make a reasoned
decision." Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1979).
Uncertainty hampers the goal of reasoned decisionmaking by forcing guesswork. Before the adop-
tion of the CEQ regulations courts interpreted NEPA to require some gathering of inforation in
cases of uncertainty, but the very lack of specificity in the requirement led to discrepancies in its
enforcement. Thus in some instances courts were willing to allow missing information to be gathered
after a decision to proceed was reached, County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior. 562 F.2d 1368
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978): Sierra Club v. Morton. 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir.
1975), or to let the agency proceed even though potentially important information was lacking.
Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part sub non. Western Oil & Gas Assoc. v.
Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 439 F. Supp. 980, 993
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
A similar charge of uneven enforcement could be levelled against the court in Village of False Pass
v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984), decided after the CEQ regulations were promulgated. be-
cause the court did not require a worst case analysis concerning clearly uncertain consequences. That
case dealt with lease sales, however, a preliminary stage in offshore oil development, and the court
was careful to say that its decision not to require the gathering of information or the production of a
worst case analysis was being made well before the irretrievable commitment of resources. Id. at
614. The dissent, relying on the specific requirements of the new regulation. thought that the infor-
mation was necessary even at the lease sale stage. Id. at 617 (Canby, J.. dissenting).
Section 1502.22(a) conforms to NEPA's general goal and the cases interpreting it. but is much
more specific. The section now calls upon the agency in straightforward terms to get the missing
information. One court interpreted the section to require site-specific research and original research
by the agency. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman. 714 F.2d 901. 904 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover.
the decisions reveal that the more specific regulation has fostered greater court scrutiny of the agency
duty to gather information. The best example of that close scrutiny is SOE. No. 83-3908 (9th Cir.
Jan. 27. 1984); see also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
22. If the duty to gather information were made absolute, agency action in the face of uncertainty
would often be effectively stopped. CEQ has instead made available a defense of impossibility to
discharge the duty. If an agency can show either that the cost of getting information is exorbitant or
that no known means exist to get it, it may proceed with the action by complying with section (b).
Courts have not established guidelines for when a cost may be considered exorbitant. Exorbitance
should be interpreted in light of the usefulness of the missing information and the seriousness of the
possible harm. For example, a costly study likely to establish the true risk to people posed by pesti-
cide use should be less readily termed exorbitant than equally expensive but more speculative re-
search into rather minor environmental risks.
The other prong of the impossibility defense is a state of the art defense. If the information is
missing because no one knows how to get it, the agency will not be precluded from acting until it
obtains it. No court has decided what state of the art means in the context of this regulation. The state
of the art test should mean the agency must gather information using the best methods known. it
would not be sufficient to use general industry practices or particular methods that are actually being
used. It is fair to insist that where an action's proponents invoke the state of the art defense, they
should come forth with evidence that there are indeed no known means for obtaining the missing
information.
23. See supra note 19. It is unclear what sort of deliberation or decisionmaking is involved in the
weighing. Although the regulation does not expressly mention costs and benefits, the weighing could
be construed as a cost benefit analysis. By analogy, the uncertain risks would be the costs and the
need for the action would be the benefits against which costs would be balanced.
The analogy should be only loosely followed in practice. A detailed cost benefit analysis is un-
suited to taking uncertainty into account. An agency at this stage of EIS development will not know
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The worst case analysis regulation has not been before the Supreme
Court and was not considered by a circuit court until 1983. In Sierra Club
v. Sigler,24 the Fifth Circuit interpreted the regulation to require the Army
Corps of Engineers to prepare a worst case analysis on allowing large oil
tankers into Galveston Bay. In Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic
Sprays v. Watt (SOCATS), 25 the Ninth Circuit held that the Bureau of
Land Management's (BLM) failure to prepare such a worst case analysis
for its herbicide spraying program in parts of Oregon was grounds for
enjoining the spraying. In Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark (SOE),26 the
Ninth Circuit extended the SOCATS ban on herbicide spraying to Forest
Service land in Oregon and also held that section 1502.22(a) required the
agencies to gather, or perform original research to produce, additional
information.27 In the more recent case of Village of False Pass v. Clark,28
however, the Ninth Circuit declined to interpret the regulation to require
further research or a worst case analysis of the effects of a possible major
oil spill at the preliminary stage of offshore oil leasing. 29
II. ANALYSIS
A. When Must Missing Information Be Gathered?
Under Section 1502.22(a) agencies must gather and include in the EIS
information relevant to adverse environmental impacts. The significance
'of missing information may serve to qualify the duty placed on an
agency. If the information is crucial to an informed choice, the agency
what the costs of an action will be and cannot determine whether benefits outweigh them. Yet the
general weighing process may still be useful to at least require a preliminary guess on whether the
agency should go ahead with further analysis. If, for example, probable costs far exceed any possible
benefits, it seems useful for an agency to stop before it goes on to explore the greatest possible costs
(the worst case).
The regulation appears to apply to any scientific uncertainty anywhere in an EIS: the phrase
"[w]hen an agency is evaluating significant adverse effects on the human environment in an environ-
mental impact statement and there are gaps in relevant information or scientific uncertainty" makes
no mention of just where in the EIS it comes into play. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1984). Subsection (b),
which requires a worst case analysis, has in contrast the qualifier "if the agency proceeds." Thus a
consistent reading would require the agency to disclose and try to reduce uncertainty in any of the
alternatives before it, but it need only produce a worst case analysis for the alternative upon which it
chooses to act. The agency may gather the information necessary under section (a), weigh the risks,
and then decide not to go ahead with that alternative. It is then free to pick an alternative involving
less or no uncertainty or having a greater potential benefit, both for EIS preparation and perhaps final
action.
24. 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
25. 720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983).
26. No. 83-3908 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984).
27. Id. at 452.
28. 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 614.
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must of course obtain it, but if it is merely of dubious worth, the agency
can disregard it. The regulation offers no guidelines beyond requiring that
"essential" information be gathered if the costs are not "exorbitant."
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to address the issue of how signifi-
cant missing information must be before it comes within the regulation's
ambit. The circuit appears undecided on the issue. The SOE court read
the regulation to mean that all important information must be gathered. 30
In contrast, the False Pass court interpreted it to mean that only essential
information was necessary. 3'
Although the regulation uses the word "essential,"- 32 that term should
be construed generously. As the SOE court suggested, agencies should
gather not only information that is indispensible to a decision, but also
information that is either significant or important. 33 Only unimportant or
irrelevant information should fall outside the requirement.
A broad interpretation of what information is "essential" is necessary
to reconcile the subsections of section 1502.22. Under subsection (b)(1).
for example, if "essential" information is not known because the costs of
getting it would be exorbitant, the agency can proceed without gathering
it only by first preparing a worst case analysis. 34 Yet under subsection
(b)(2), if "important" information is missing because the means of get-
ting it are unknown, the subsection again requires a worst case analysis. 35
Because the regulation impliedly seeks to make all important information
available to the decisionmaker, "important" information unavailable be-
cause of exorbitant cost should also mandate a worst case analysis. Sub-
section (a) should thus be squared with subsection (b), so that agencies
gather all available important information.
Reading "essential" to mean "important" throughout the regulation
simplifies interpretation and serves the general goal of reducing the scien-
tific uncertainty facing the agency. 36 Retaining a distinction between the
terms could render an irrational result. If "essential" means one thing
30. SOE. No. 83-3908, slip op. at 446 n.5 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984). The SOE court was the first
appellate court to consider the issue. It decided that no rational distinction could be drawn between
"essential" and "important." It held that information should be gathered if essential. if significant.
or if important. Id.
31. 733 F.2d at 614. In False Pass a different panel of the Ninth Circuit revived the distinction
and expressly charged the lower courts with trying to honor it. That panel did not offer any reasons
for its departure from the earlier decision, but apparently decided that CEQ meant something when it
chose its particular words.
32. See supra note 19.
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34. 40C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(1)(1984).
35. Id. § 1502.22(b)(2).
36. Although no history is available to reveal CEQ's intentions, it must have included § 1502.22
to reduce, or enable agencies to forthrightly deal with, scientific uncertainty. An overall goal implicit
in the regulations was to simplify and clarify agency duties in NEPA compliance.
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and "important" another, the reason why information is missing could
determine the action an agency need take. "Important" butnot "essen-
tial" information that was exorbitantly expensive to- gather would not
mandate the production of a worst case analysis, while similar informa-
tion beyond the state of the art would. Because CEQ has offered no rea-
son for the distinction required by a literal reading, 37 it is fair to suppose
that CEQ intended no distinction between "important" and "essen-
tial." 38
Courts should also require agencies to gather important as well as in-
dispensible information because of the difficulty in determining what in-
formation is absolutely essential to a decision before the information is
gathered. Consensus can be more easily reached on what is important to a
decisionmaker concerning possible environmental impacts than on what
is essential. For example, a chemical company might argue that data on
long-delayed effects on animals of pesticide use was not essential, while
environmental groups would counter that information on increased pest
infestation due to non-action would also be not essential. Each would
more likely concede that all such information is important to the decision.
By including all information that opposing groups consider important, the
agency shows that it is seriously considering each view.
A narrower interpretation of "essential" would involve the court in a
premature consideration of the projected agency decision itself. Deter-
mining whether information will be essential to a future agency decision
probably would involve the court in more detailed analysis of the oppos-
ing views than would determining if the information will be important.
By making such a detailed inquiry, the court could become embroiled in
the issue of the merits of potential agency action before the agency de-
cides to proceed with such action. Moreover, because court review comes
only after an agency decision, few courts are likely to decide that missing
information was essential to the agency choice unless they think the
agency choice was wrong. Conversely, a court will not remand by label-
ing "essential" missing information that it thinks in fact supports the de-
cision the agency made.
A broader interpretation of "essential" could lead to different and
more predictable results. A reviewing court would not attempt to resolve
the issue of what information, out of all the important information
37. The two places CEQ might have provided a reason are its "Forty Most Asked Questions,"
published in the Federal Register, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026 (Monday, March 3, 1981), and its now with-
drawn "Guidelines," 48 Fed. Reg. 36,486 (1983), discussed infra at note 41.
38. The SOE court pointed out the anomaly posed by a literal reading and first suggested the
substitution of "important." SOE, No. 83-3908, slip op. at 446 n.5 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984). The
dissent in False Pass agreed with that interpretation, 733 F.2d at 617 n. I (Canby, J., dissenting), but
the majority's reading may keep alive the literal approach.
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gathered, was essential to the decision. If a court were to remand under
the broader reading, its determination that unconsidered data was impor-
tant would not be as strong an indication that the court believed the
agency decision was incorrect. The important missing information could
well support the path the agency took even though the agency failed in its
duty to gather it. The agency on remand could consider the important
information and yet stand firm with its original decision. An agency gath-
ering all important information will not face remand, unlike the agency
hoping to encounter a court agreeing with its determination of which in-
formation was crucial to its decision.
An argument may be made that too much information will be gathered
since agencies and courts may have difficulty in drawing the line between
important and unimportant information. That view misses the point, how-
ever, that the risk and the danger usually lie along the path of proceeding
in the dark, not in too much light. Also, in those cases where gathering
too much information itself dangerously delays beneficial agency action,
common sense dictates including the risk of delay in deciding whether the
missing data is indeed important.
B. What Must the Worst Case Analysis Contain?
Subsection (b) of section 1502.22 requires that if an agency discusses
an alternative with persistently uncertain consequences it must prepare a
worst case analysis. Only the SOE court has considered the adequacy of
an actual worst case analysis and it found the analysis inadequate. The
court specified as inadequacies of the analysis that it was too short39 and
that it erroneously assumed a no-risk exposure level. 40 Although such
specifics are useful both for future reviewing courts and agency analysts
as examples of pitfalls to avoid, the full scope of an adequate analysis has
yet to be delineated. 4 1 The SOE court did suggest further guidelines, such
39. SOE, No. 83-3908. slip op. at 448 (9th Cir. Jan. 27. 1984).
40. Id.
41. The court held that the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) analysis of human health ef-
fects after exposure to herbicides was flawed. The BLM's critical mistake was that it assumed no
effects would occur at low levels of exposure, an assumption the court found "'entirely wrong." Id.
at 448. The court said that the contents of the BLM's analysis could appear in a proper worst case
analysis, but indicated that fuller discussion of herbicide toxicity was required. Id. at 448 n.8. The
court also said, "The record in Merrell [a case consolidated with SOE] reveals that it is the polic
' 
of
the BLM to avoid discussion of the toxicity of the herbicides it uses. . . . This policy is clearly
impermissible." Id. at 449.
The SOE court also described in more general terms what future worst case analyses should con-
tain. It made clear that discussion of probabilities should only come after discussion of worst case
consequences. Id. at 448-49. It endorsed the "range of risks" requirement through analogy to
NEPA's range of alternatives in EIS preparation. Id. at 448 n.7. Finally, it implicitly rejected tenta-
tive guidance from CEQ which would have required the analysis only after foreseeable effects had
Vol. 60:101, 1984
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as a "spectrum of events" requirement,42 but those suggestions do not
bind future courts.
In assessing the adequacy of a worst case analysis, reviewing courts
should be concerned with whether the decisionmaker choosing to take a
particular risk was well informed by a scientist or analyst about both the
possible consequences of the action and the probabilty of each conse-
quence occurring. The value or cost of various harms, on the other hand,
requires a policy determination; for example, is the death of three infants
"worse" than wiping out a rare subspecies of bird? And what probability
of occurrence can be tolerated? The scientist writing the worst case analy-
sis should not attempt to answer such questions.
The worst case analysis should instead take care to separate the harms
from the probabilities of a risk so that an agency decisionmaker has full
information. If the worst case analyst screens these two components of
each risky agency action from the decisionmaker, the decisionmaker can-
not properly judge its severity. In SOE, for example, the BLM's worst
case analysis failed to indicate the probability of each harm potentially
caused by its herbicides. 43 The court properly found that such a failure
rendered the analysis wholly inadequate. 44
Similarly, the analyst should separately consider the many possible
consequences of an agency action. For example, in Sigler the Fifth Cir-
cuit directed the Corps of Engineers to prepare a worst case analysis on
allowing tankers in Galveston Bay. 45 In that situation, if an analyst were
to tell a decisionmaker that the worst potential consequence was a large
oil tanker spill in June when wildlife is most affected, the decisionmaker
would not know the underlying relevant facts. No decisionmaker can ac-
quire the full expertise of her staff, but she should be informed about what
kind of wildlife might be affected, how much worse a June spill is com-
pared to a July or December one, whether traffic volume or weather
makes spills more dangerous at certain times of year, and other relevant
been determined. Id. at 448. In August of 1983 CEQ published a proposed Guideline to § 1502.22
establishing a threshold of "reasonably foreseeable impacts or effects" before any worst case analy-
sis need be prepared. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,486 (1983). As the former general counsel for CEQ pointed
out, the Guideline was an about-face for CEQ. Yost, Don't Gut the Worst Case Analysis, 13 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,394, 10,395 (Dec. 1983). Since "reasonably foreseeable" implies at
least some element of probability, it contradicts the CEQ's earlier interpretation that consequences
and probability were to be kept separate. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (1981). Also, in SOE, the
court expressly ruled out foreseeability or probability of any sort as a threshold for requiring the worst
case analysis. SOE, No. 83-3908, slip op. at 448 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984) ("The agency may not omit
the analysis only because it believes the worst case is unlikely.") (quoting SOCATS, 720 F.2d at
1479).
42. SOE, No. 83-3908, slip op. at 448 n.7 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984).
43. Id. at 448-49.
44. Id.
45. 695 F.2d at 974-75.
109
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facts concerning possible harms. Only a decisionmaker who understands
both consequences and probabilities as fully as possible can make an in-
formed policy choice on whether certain risks are worthwhile.
One way to avoid the possible problem of decisionmaking by the ana-
lyst is to mandate that the analysis include a range of worst cases. 46 The
analysis should not simply identify the one worst consequence, but sev-
eral bad consequences. For example, if effect A is catastrophic and has a
1% chance of happening, and effect B is not as bad but has a 10% chance
of happening, an analyst may decide B is the "worst case" and not in-
clude effect A in the worst case analysis, precluding the decisionmaker
from viewing and comparing the various risks. 47 The requirement of ad-
dressing a range of bad cases thus puts the policy decision of what really
is the "worst case" in the hands of the agency head making the final risk
determination of the action.
Requiring agencies to prepare a range of worst cases need not produce
unmanageable paperwork. Courts and agencies can limit the range by re-
quiring that the study consider only data and projections potentially im-
portant to a decisionmaker. The threshold requirement of a base of infor-
mation from which to project will keep the range within the scientifically
possible. 48 Analyses will probably vary, with agencies wanting a more
detailed analysis on the more catastrophic consequences, unless an accu-
rate analysis shows their risks to be extremely low.
C. The Role Of The Courts
The courts applying section 1502.22 have uniformly taken a hard look
at agency compliance with the regulation, 49 and in most cases courts have
46. CEQ has endorsed the idea that the analysis contain a range of consequences: "In addition to
an analysis of a low probability/catastrophic impact event, the worst case analysis should also include
a spectrum of events of higher probability but less drastic impact." 46 Fed. Reg. 18.026. 18.032
(March 3, 1981), cited with approval in SOE, No. 83-3908. slip op. at 447 (9th Cir. Jan. 27. 1984).
47. To speculate on the facts of SOE. one might imagine that the herbicides had a I% chance of
causing a birth defect in one child and a 10% chance of causing birth defects in the local deer herd.
Which eventuality is the "'worst" case is not for the statistician or scientist alone to decide.
48. There must be a body of data from which a certain pessimistic projection reasonably flows A
baseless hunch that some day scientists will prove the toxicity of plywood made from fertilized trees
would not be sufficient support for a worst case analysis. and is unlike the prediction implicit in Sigler
that since large oil spills have happened before, they could happen again. The Sigler court expressed
this threshold requirement by saying that "[tihere must, of course, be a base of information upon
which to project past these [state of the art] limits." 695 F.2d at 975. There the possibility of a large
oil spill was grounded in some credible base of information. Id.
49. Each of the four appellate decisons begins with a presumption of scrutiny, not of deference.
False Pass, 733 F.2d at 613: SOE. No. 83-3908. slip op. at 446 (9th Cir. Jan. 27. 1984): SOCATS.
720 F.2d at 1479: Sigler, 695 F.2d at 967-68.
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found deficiencies and ordered corrective action. 50 Continued strict scru-
tiny by courts comports with a current theory of agency decisionmaking,
furthers NEPA's goal of better decisionmaking, facilitates court review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and provides greater fair-
ness to those potentially affected by agency action.
1. Improved Agency Decisionmaking
Courts traditionally have deferred to agency decisions on the basis of
two theories of agency decisionmaking. Courts may see agencies either as
administrative arms of government run by neutral or non-political ex-
perts, or as mini legislatures, resolving problems through accord and
compromise among competing interests. 51 A more recent theory of
agency decisionmaking contends that agencies are not necessarily run by
experts, nor do their decisions represent an amicable accord among com-
peting interests; rather they are merely "muddling through" and deserve
the strict scrutiny they get.52 The BLM and Forest Service decisions to
proceed with herbicide spraying, for example, reflected no special scien-
tific expertise on the health effects of herbicides; in fact the agencies ad-
mitted having little or no ability to conduct research on the matter them-
selves. 53 There was also no evidence of the agency fashioning a
compromise between the divergent views of the timber industry and envi-
ronmentalists.
Agencies may not only muddle along, but may also keep their mud-
dling quiet. Agencies have been reluctant to do worst case analyses. 54
Agencies charged with management functions will be reluctant to
50. The exception was False Pass, where the court decided to wait for later stages of oil lease
development before deciding the merits of requiring a worst case analysis. 733 F.2d at 615-16.
51. Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscram-
bling the Benzene Decision, I I ENvT'L L. 301, 309-10 (1981).
52. Id. at 311-12.
53. SOE, No. 83-3908, slip op. at 448 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 1984). Also, the court precluded the
agency in SOE from relying on Environmental Protection Agency registration data for the safety of
herbicide use. The court's reasons included: (1) registration of the herbicides used was only "condi-
tional," meaning that less than complete data exists, (2) registration involves a "cost benefit" analy-
sis, (3) registration does not reflect a conclusion that a herbicide is safe under any conditions, and (4)
each agency has an independant duty under NEPA to assess the safety of the herbicides it uses. Id. at
451.
54. Council on Environmental Quality, Talking Points on CEQ's Oversight of Agency Compli-
ance with the NEPA Regulations (1980), quoted in Liebsman, The Council on Environmental Qual-
ity's Regulations to Implement the National Environmental Policy Act-Will They Further NEPA's
Substantive Mandate? 10 ENvmT. L. REt. (ENvmL. L. INsT.) 50,039, 50,048 n. 115, 50,049 (1980). A
study of 242 draft EIS's and 88 records of decision led CEQ to conclude that EIS's rarely address the
question of incomplete and unavailable information as required by § 1502.22. Id. at 50,049.
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disclose uncertainty and risk. 55 Thus a "muddling" agency's decision
not to gather more information, disclose uncertainty, or prepare a worst
case analysis should not be given much deference by the courts, but rather
scrutinized with the hardest of looks.
Agency recalcitrance or lack of good faith need not exist, however, to
justify strict scrutiny by the courts. Scientific uncertainty and the atten-
dant risks are justification enough for strict scrutiny where the procedures
under section 1502.22 have been followed. The regulation is new to both
agencies and courts, and both have a duty to comply with its spirit while
interpreting its letter.
2. Fulfilling the Purposes of NEPA
Section 1502.22 as a whole adds bite to NEPA's provisions on agency
decisionmaking. Before its adoption, NEPA's requirement for reasoned
decisionmaking 56 often led, in the face of scientific uncertainty, to a "soft
glance" by the courts at agency choice. 57 Section 1502.22 does not man-
date particular choices, and does not require closer review of agency deci-
sions. By setting out more detailed procedural requirements, however, it
invites the courts to take a harder look at what agencies do under condi-
tions of uncertainty. This scrutiny will not only affect the fairness of the
process by which agency choices are made, but ultimately may impose
55. Agency decisionmakers who have observed no serious health effects from herbicides and
who may be subconsciously biased towards the timber industry's demands for herbicide use probably
cannot be relied on to come forward with pessimistic predictions. Strict court review may be needed
to overcome such reluctance. A willingness to undertake that review is illustrated by one federal
judge who responded to agency recalcitrance in completing the worst case analysis he ordered by
saying in open court. "'[tlhese officials will spend their spring in jail-in jail-if they do not stop
[spraying]." Herbicide spraying was enjoined on all national forest land in Oregon and Washington
and on all BLM land in Oregon (some 39 million acres altogether) until the worst case analysis was
finished. Seattle Post-intelligencer, A-I, Col. 5. March 2, 1984. The threat of such sanctions should
help overcome reluctance to divulge pessimistic projections.
56. See supra note 21.
57. A good example is Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency. 541 F.2d I. 28 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). cert. denied sub non. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 426 U.S. 941 (1977). Because uncertainty abounded, an agency choice on reductions of
lead content in gasoline was given deference. But compare Scientists Institute for Public Information,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Reasonable forecast-
ing and speculation is thus implicit in NEPA. and we must reject any attempt by agencies to shirk
their responsibilities under NEPA by labeling any and all discussion of future environmental effects
as 'crystal ball inquiry.'").
Deference may be more appropriate to an agency charged with regulating hazards, as EPA was in
Ethyl. The danger already exists, and agency action is intended to mitigate it. In contrast, the Forest
Service in SOE, the BLM in SOCATS. or the Army Corps of Engineers in Sigler had no particular
mandate to determine -'safe" levels of risk.
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substantive constraints on agency choices that may pose risks of great
environmental harm. 58
The information gathering requirement of section 1502.22 exists inde-
pendent from the worst case analysis and should be strictly enforced by
courts to promote informed decisionmaking. A requirement that agencies
gather available information when the cost of doing so is not exorbitant is
basic to the continued viability of NEPA itself. 59 The regulation merely
clarifies what courts had previously recognized as a central mandate of
the Act. The gathering of important missing information changes the con-
text of choice to one of greater certainty and rationality.
Out of that context better decisions should emerge. 60 "Better" should
mean, under the reading suggested by NEPA's purpose statement in sec-
tion 101, more environmentally sensitive. 61 Before adoption of its regula-
tions, CEQ was concerned that agencies were shirking their duties to the
environment even as they prepared adequate-looking EIS's. 62 The new
regulations were designed to remedy this situation and "tie the process to
the heart of the Act ... by imposing requirements to articulate the deci-
sion and affirmatively condition and monitor agency actions on environ-
mental grounds.' '63
Disclosure of uncertainty and the publication of a worst case analysis
will make agencies more conservative in choosing to take risky actions.
The worst case analysis is fairly specific, will become quite conspicuous,
and is by definition pessimistic. This officially authorized horror story is
the stuff front page copy is made of, and an agency would probably rather
not be subjected to such publicity. 64 Reluctance to proceed, coupled with
the courts' enforcement of the regulations, will make agencies more
58. The introductory and explanatory section of CEQ's regulations states:
Ultimately, of course, it is not better documents but better decisions that count. NEPA's pur-
pose is not to generate paperwork-even excellent paperwork-but to foster excellent action.
The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on under-
standing of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore and enhance the
environment. These regulations provide the direction to achieve this purpose.
40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1983).
59. A beneficial by-product is that identification of what is important but unknown may be a
positive contribution to the advancement of science that is not likely to be made by concentrating on
"reductionist" approaches of pursuing knowledge for its own sake. L. CALDWELL, SCIENCE AND THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 105 (1982).
60. See supra note 58.
61. See supra note 1.
62. Liebsman, supra note 54, at 50,051.
63. Id.
64. As one author circumspectly noted, "agencies may be less likely to take risks when the
possible adverse effects of their action become part of a reviewable public record." Note, supra note
4, at 386. Ironically it is the failure to prepare a worst case analysis that has focused the spotlight on
agencies so far. See supra note 54.
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conservative in their decisions or more considerate of alternatives involv-
ing less uncertainty.
In cases where the courts have strictly scrutinized agency compliance
with the regulations, the practical effect has been to halt agency action.
For example, in SOCATS and SOE the agencies explained their decision
to proceed by emphasizing the low probability of cancer incidence- but
the courts, taking a hard look, did not agree. In SOCATS the court held
that the "possiblity that the safe level of dosage for herbicides is low or
even nonexistent creates a possibility" of effects that must be addressed
by a worst case analysis. 65 In SOE, the court was not deferential to the
worst case analysis prepared by the BLM. It criticized the analysis pre-
pared by the BLM as having proceeded from a misguided assumption that
at some dosage level the herbicides were safe. 66 Yet since uncertainty
existed, a pessimistic or worst case view would be that the level of expo-
sure was not safe, and that use would cause cancer and kill animals and
people. 67 The practical effect of the deficiency in the worst case analysis
has been to halt herbicide spraying by the agencies in the two northwest
states.
68
A hard look review of agency compliance need not halt agency action.
An agency that adheres to the regulations and prepares a thorough worst
case analysis is free to take any non-arbitrary, non-capricious course of
action. Strict review, however, ensures that agencies do not take short-
cuts in the airing of potential dangers. If the agency action is not halted
pending such disclosures, it could have irreversible environmental im-
pacts and render court review a post facto exercise in futility.
65. 720 F.2d at 1479.
66. No. 83-3908. slip op. at 448 (9th Cir. Jan. 27. 1984).
67. It is unclear just how low the risk of cancer was. An argument may be made that at infinitely
low probabilities risk becomes, in effect, inconsequential. Before dismissing such risks out of hand.
it is best to remember that policy judgments are being made. and people are being affected. The force
of non-scientific experience should be a value weighed in good decisionmaking. That value is well
expressed in Kellman, ALrietv over the TMI Accident: An EssaY on the Linits of Inquir under
NEPA, 51 GEO. WASH- L. REv. 219. 247 (1983) ("In March 1979, an event with a statistically
insignificant probability of occurring did occur. History is full of instances where the improbable
occurred. Arguably, law should be as responsive to the lessons of history as to the calculations of
technical experts.").
68. See supra note 55. Conservatism in the field of toxic chemicals accords perfectly with NEPA
mandates, and courts should not be reluctant to acknowledge it. The low dose. long term cancer risk
posed by BLM and Forest Service spraying, for example, is precisely the sort of risk least well known
about in scientific circles. Current state of the art scientific analysis is unable to predict safe threshold
doses for any carcinogen. As one highly reputable study found:
The self-replicating nature of cancer, the multiplicity of causative factors to which individuals
can be exposed, the additive and possibly synergistic combination of effects, and the wide range
of individual susceptibilities work together in making it currently unreliable to predict a thresh-
old below which human population exposure to a carcinogen has no effect on cancer risk.
Scientific Causes for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks. 63 J. NTL
CANCER Soc'y. 253, 264 (July 1979).
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3. Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act
A hard look at an agency's interpretation of section 1502.22 will pro-
mote a more complete record from which courts can properly judge
agency choice under the APA. 69 Agencies must comply with CEQ's reg-
ulations, and reviewing courts have unwritten discretion to apply a hard
or soft look in deciding whether an agency has complied. 70 This Com-
ment argues for a hard look at agency interpretation so that the purposes
of the regulation are fulfilled.
Nowhere do CEQ's regulations provide for judicial review of the final
agency choice. The non-adjudicative agencies' decisions are presumed to
be a policy choice within the agencies' and not the courts' authority. The
APA, however, authorizes federal courts to review substantive decisions,
including environmental decisions, of all federal agencies using an "arbi-
trary and capricious" test. 71 For example, it may be so foolhardy for an
agency to proceed in the face of risks disclosed by information gathering
or a worst case analysis that agency action would be deemed "arbitrary
and capricious."
Strict review for compliance with the regulations is consistent with
"arbitrary and capricious" review of the substantive decision. Strict ad-
herence to the regulations will not allow an agency to hide risks involving
scientific uncertainty and may stop an agency from proceeding. On the
other hand, if a worst case analysis indicates that the worst consequences
are not very significant, it is possible that an agency could shortcut other
procedural requirements, 72 and such a choice would not be arbitrary. En-
forcing strict adherence to section 1502.22 allows for a more complete
record when the decision to proceed is reviewed under the arbitrary and
capricious standard. 73
69. 5U.S.c. §706(2)(A)(1982).
70. See Marcel, The Role of the Courts in a Legislative And Administrative Legal System-The
Use of Hard Look Review in Federal Environmental Litigation, 62 OR. L. REv. 403 (1983) (discuss-
ing review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)).
71. Marcel, supra note 70, at 406.
72. Thus mitigation (required under 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f) and 1502.16(h)) may not be neces-
sary where consequences are insignificant. Also, the list of "reasonable" alternatives (required under
40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(a-c) and 1502.16(d-f)) may shrink because the more beneficial, harmless, and
cost-effective one alternative becomes, the less reasonable become alternatives that are less benefi-
cial, possibly more harmful, and less cost-effective.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1983), requires a "record of decision" of each agency producing EIS's,
to facilitate review. An agency must "[ildentify all alternatives considered by the agency in reaching
its decision, specifying the alternative or alternatives which were considered to be environmentally
preferable." Id. It must also "[s]tate whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environ-
mental harm from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they were not. A
monitoring and enforcement program shall be adopted and summarized where applicable for any
mitigation." Id.
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4. Fairness to Those Potentially Affected
Another purpose that strict scrutiny of CEQ's regulation serves is to
protect those potentially hurt by agency action. Through public disclosure
people and interests that could be adversely affected gain a greater aware-
ness of what risks the action may impose on them. Improved decision-
making should also increase their chances of being safeguarded from dan-
gerous choices. Finally, they may gain a sense of fairness and respect for
the decision by participating, in at least limited ways, in the decisionmak-
ing process itself.74
A hard look at agency action involving uncertainty will help enforce
the courts' duty to be fair. Deference to an agency that does not know
what might happen and has no good reason to otherwise inform people of
its lack of knowledge would be fundamentally unfair. 75 The extra process
given by more diligent information gathering, more open disclosure of
uncertainty, and frank admission of possible dangers is due those who
may be hurt by the uncertain catastrophe. Courts can and should temper
agencies' concern for social utility and getting things done with a hard
look to protect the more personal concerns and rights of those potentially
affected.
III. CONCLUSION
CEQ's regulation on scientific uncertainty imposes duties on agencies
that were not explicitly imposed by NEPA. Agencies must gather relevant
missing information, and they should gather it whenever it is important to
the decision. If the information is unavailable, the agency must prepare a
worst case analysis. That analysis should keep possible harms and their
probabilities separate as well as address a range of pessimistic projec-
tions. Because agency response to the problems posed by scientific uncer-
tainty is often not within agency expertise, and the dangers of improper
response are great, court review of compliance with the CEQ regulation
should be strict.
Mark Reeve
74. At a minimum, the public may participate in decisionmaking during a 45-day written com-
ment period and during agency hearings. SOE, slip op. at 450:40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (1983).
75. Rodgers. Building Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Resources Law. 53 CoLo. L. REV.
213,226 (1982).
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